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(6) Nozick 1999, 9.
(7) Pars pro toto: "Past-referring obligations are historical
when those who are supposed to be responsible for keeping
the promise, honouring the contract, paying the debt, or
making the reparation are not the ones who made the pro-
mise or did the deeds, but their descendants or successors."
(Thompson 2003, x). See also: Thompson 2000, 2001.
(8) In this understanding, the term 'historical injustice' is
only applicable if living persons have rights and obligations
on the basis of wrongs suﬀered by deceased people. Thus, a
historical injustice consists in ignoring, here and now, a hi-
storical obligation (which is an obligation of living people in
virtue of past wrongs). This is, presumably, the reason why
Sher (1981) refers to injustices in the (remote) past as 'an-
cient wrongs'; historical wrongs are necessary, but no suﬃ-
cient conditions of historical injustice. In a similar vein:
"Central to the topic of historical injustice, as I understand
it, is the question whether and how past injustice and, more
generally, wrongs can aﬀect present moral reasons for ac-
tion." (Pogge 2004, 117, italics mine).
(9) Goodin 2000.
(10) “(…) a female slave has (in Christian countries) an ad-
mitted right (…) to refuse to her master the last familiarity.
Not so the wife: however brutal the tyrant she may unfor-
tunately be chained to (…) he can claim from her and en-
force the lowest degradation of a human being, that of being
made the instrument of the animal function contrary to her
inclination.” (Mill CW 21, 285).
(11) I tend to say that a violation of natural rights counts as
a natural crime only if the perpetrator is morally competent.
One may object that such a usage misses the distinction bet-
ween the criminality of an act and the question of guilt. A
natural rights violation should be considered as a natural
crime even if the perpetrator is morally incompetent and,
thus, not to blame for it. Otherwise, one would have to say
that morally incompetent agents have the right to violate
natural rights. My reply is that morally incompetent agents
are beyond right and wrong and, hence, cannot possibly
have a right to commit natural crimes. Morally incompe-
8
tent agents can be bad and produce extremely ill conse-
quences but, like a wild beast that kills a child, they are no
criminals. 
(12) One aspect of the exposedness criterion, which some
may find disturbing, is that it relieves the members of the
‘worst societies’ of moral responsibility. Since violations of
natural rights – committed by members of morally incom-
petent societies – would not count as historical injustice, it
would follow that the perpetrators would not be culpable or
under special obligations of corrective justice. It is worthy of
note, though, that contextualism does not deny claims of
those who were harmed by historical ill; these claims, ho-
wever rest upon the ongoing distributional consequences of
past social practices, consequences that make the present
structure unjust.
(13) I thank one of the reviewers for urging me to make this
point more explicit.
(14) Luther’s words were: “Here I stand; I can do no other.
God help me. Amen.”
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Intergenerational Rights?
by Prof. Dr. Richard Vernon
Abstract: Past injustices demand a
 response if they have led to present de-
privation. But skeptics argue that there
is no need to introduce a self-contained concept
of 'historical justice' as our general concepts of
 justice provide all the necessary resources to deal
with present inequalities. A rights-based approach
to intergenerational issues has some advantages
when compared to rival approaches: those based
on intergenerational community, for example, or
on obligations deriving from traditional conti-
nuity. While it is possible to ascribe rights to
beings who are not presently in existence, the case
for ascribing rights to future generations is much
stronger than for past generations.
Serious wrongs leave their mark on the des-
cendants of their victims. The wrongs of sla-
very, for example, or of the dispossession of
aboriginal peoples, have clearly left their marks
– in the form of continuing deprivation – on
their respective descendant groups. There have
also, of course, been other great wrongs in the
past for which no descendant victim group can
be identified – for example, the cruelties suﬀe-
red by sailors in 18th-century European war-
ships. The fact that there is no descendant
victim group clearly suggests, however, that the
eﬀects of the wrong have been dissipated, for if
they had not, we would be confronted, in the
present, by an identifiable group of people
whose common life-situation had been decisi-
vely aﬀected by 18th-century naval brutality. In
yet other cases, the long passage of time has in-
terposed so many intervening events that the
connection with past wrongs has become too
tenuous: and there are also a few cases in which
relatively recent wrongs have left no percepti-
ble mark, for even though the victim group
subsists it has subsequently done well. But for
the most part, we pay serious attention to hi-
storical wrongs only when there is an identifi-
able group whose present deprivation
continues to display the eﬀects of past
 in justice.
There cannot be much doubt that present de-
privation motivates much of the concern for
injustice in the past. To lack concern about
past events may display lack of imagination: to
lack concern about present deprivation dis-
A
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9plays nothing less than moral callousness.  To
lack concern about, say, the helot class in an-
cient Sparta is surely forgivable, given more
practically urgent claims on our thoughts,
while to lack concern about African slavery and
its current consequences is to lack a functio-
ning moral capacity. So ‘historical injustice’ is
undeniably important for its contribution to
present injustice.  Paradoxically, though, it is
exactly that view that opens the idea of histo-
rical injustice to its most telling objection. For
skeptics, adopting the above argument in full,
may say: So, what compels a response is pre-
sent deprivation, and present deprivation calls
for a response on the basis of our ordinary
views about justice. How the deprivation was
caused is a matter of historical, but not moral,
importance. Whatever our general theory of
justice tells us to do, in cases of deprivation, is
what we should do. So the main reason for ta-
king historical injustice seriously can turn into
a reason for rejecting the idea of historical in-
justice altogether.1
According to ‘historical-injustice skeptics’, as
we may call them, all cases of undeserved de-
privation, whatever their origin, should stand,
initially, on the same footing. One group of
urban poor, for example, may be a group of
 aboriginal people whose way of life was extir-
pated by our ancestors; another group may be
composed of refugees whose plight was caused
by someone quite other than us, or our ance-
stors. Historical injustice skeptics would ex-
tend concern equally to both groups, or
discriminate between them on the basis of
their current deprivation – in either case,
 historical causes fall out of the picture. Is that
the right approach?
Who can have a ‘right’?
One important reason for questioning it would
arise from the idea of inter-generational rights.
Let us suppose that we decide, on the basis of
the considerations sketched above, that we
should approach matters of so-called historical
injustice in terms of a present-focused idea of
current entitlements. We would attempt, on
that basis, to figure out what rights to a share
in resources were due to various claimant
groups. A right would be a claim to a share in
common resources based either on equal mem-
bership status (civil rights) or on equal human
status (human rights). We would decide the
matter in terms of whatever indexes of fair dis-
tribution we were employing. But suppose that
another set of rights were to be thrown into the
equation – the violated rights of previous ge-
nerations, the ancestors of those who suﬀer
current deprivation? Then there would be
something other than current deprivation to
exercise a moral claim on us: moreover, that
claim would be made within a theory of gene-
ral justice – a rights-based one – and so, if suc-
cessful, would defeat the skeptical objection to
historical reparations.
If past generations can be said to have rights,
moreover, then we may also consider the pos-
sibility that future generations may have rights
too. The idea of intergenerational rights, if
valid, could help us not only with issues of re-
paration but also with issues about what we
owe to the future. Just as some of the interests
of living people have the status of rights, thus
receiving special protection, so too some of the
interests of both past and future people would
have to be given special protection in the weigh-
ing and balancing of matters that enter into
public policy. As rights, they could be set aside
only by very weighty considerations, and com-
promised only in order to safeguard other
rights. As rights, they could not be outweighed
or compromised simply because they conflic-
ted with the desires of the living. This would
lead us to a strong normative position, and one
that many will find attractive. But is it valid?
Rights and interests
We must first of all ask what a right is. A defi-
nition that is widely adopted in recent political
theory is as follows: To say that someone has a
right is to say that they have an interest that
creates a duty on the part of others to respect
it.2 A theory that set out to justify rights, or
else to explain why people take them seriously,
would therefore need to set out the importance
of certain interests to those who possess them,
so that the idea of duty to do so would become
compelling. This approach at once suggests the
possibility of supposing that past or future ge-
nerations have rights, for even those who no
longer exist or who don’t exist yet may be said
to have interests. That claim has been defen-
ded by some moral philosophers (but critici-
sed by others).3 Advocates claim that interests
may exist even though those whose interests
they are do not (do no longer, or do not yet),
pointing out that we may define harm to an
interest in terms of objective damage to it rat-
her than in terms of preventing subjective dis-
appointment (even though harm to our
interests often does both). Past generations had
goals; future generations may be assumed to
have them; so things that objectively block
those goals may be said to harm their interests
– and, if the interests are of a suﬃciently im-
portant kind, to violate their rights.
Two other important considerations support
this view. The first is that for some purposes it
is wrong to define a person’s life in terms of its
biological limits, for lives are made up in part
of relations that extend backwards and for-
wards in time, and we may do things that aﬀect
those relations after a person’s death and before
their birth: we may, for example, do what we
can to preserve institutions that past generati-
ons constructed, or create institutions – such as
legal and political ones – that will fundamen-
tally define the relations among people yet to
be born. A second consideration is that, even
in the case of living people, we do not suppose
that they must be conscious of a harm to their
interests if it is to count as a harm. Someone’s
interest in a good reputation is harmed by slan-
der, for example, even if they remain unaware
of the slander; is that only because there’s a
chance that they will eventually find out about
it?4 If living persons’ interests can be damaged
without their awareness, it cannot be that the
non-awareness of past or future generations is
fatal to the view that we can speak of harming
or protecting their interests, in their absence. It
is the loss, not the sense of loss, that counts.
Against that background, attempts to explain
reparations in terms of the rights of the decea-
sed victims themselves look attractive. The
most sustained attempt is oﬀered in a well-
known paper by Michael Ridge.5 Focusing on
the case of African slavery, Ridge argues as fol-
lows. People have an interest in the welfare of
their descendants, and African slaves would su-
rely have had an especially strong interest,
given the kin-oriented nature of their original
culture, and given that family life was the one
significant area in which they may (sometimes)
have enjoyed some autonomy. They had, then,
a powerful interest in the happiness and suc-
cess of their children and their more distant
progeny, and, given the sense (outlined above)
in which interests may survive their bearers, we
may say that this interest of theirs is one that
can currently be advanced – or harmed – by
how societies treat their descendants. To in-
crease their opportunities for success – by
means of aﬃrmative action policies, for exam-
ple – is thus to advance an interest of the slaves
themselves; “one of the ways we can benefit the
dead, if we can benefit them at all, is by pro-
moting certain of their deeply held concerns.”6
And since, in Ridge’s view, we have ‘duties’ to
do so, duties arising directly from the interests
in question, a case has been made out for as-
cribing rights to deceased slaves, and by impli-
cation to other past generations of persons
whose important interest in their descendants’
welfare has been thwarted by oppression. 
On this argument, if it can be sustained, we do
not face the problem of explaining how it is
that a wrong suﬀered by one generation can
descend to another, a task that other theories of
reparative justice may have to face: for nothing
has ‘descended,’ the rights in question are
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Because we don't think about future
generations, they will never forget us. 
/ Henrik Tikkanen /
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a constitution was not meant to outlast its crea-
tors, it would be no diﬀerent from an ordinary
law.9
In both cases, however, the use of the model of
tradition proves misleading. It is true that
scientific traditions, environmentalist policies,
and constitutions are all forward-looking: but
they are not forward-looking in the same way.
In the scientific case, intergenerational com-
munity exists in the sense that future generati-
ons will cast their verdict on the proposals that
we make, and thus establish or change the
meaning of what we do. In the case of envi-
ronmentalist policies, however, the objective is
not to advance hypotheses that will stand or
fall with the unknowable judgments of future
generations, but to avoid imposing on future
generations conditions that we now know to
be unpleasant or disastrous. And the case of
constitutionalism is diﬀerent again. Constitu-
tional designers believe that they have a con-
ception of political life that can best be
sustained by arrangements that foster some
kinds of contributions and forbid or impede
others. In making and imposing those arran-
gements, the generation in question obviously
takes into account the fear that future genera-
tions may think diﬀerently; but it designs in-
stitutions in a way that will constrain future
generations’ choices. For example, the genera-
tion in question may fear that future majori-
ties may wish to sweep away the rights of
dissident minorities, and so it may build in de-
vices that make it impossible or very hard to
do so – a typical constitutional provision. Con-
sider how entirely diﬀerent that is from the
scientific case: in that case, if future generations
reject my proposals I will have failed, for I ad-
vance them in the hope that they will survive
fuller scrutiny. In the constitutionalist case, if
future generations reject my proposals they will
have failed, for I advance them in order to close
oﬀ action rather than, as in the case of a scien-
tific tradition, to open enquiry.
So the proposed analogy with traditions may
not illuminate the diﬀerent kind of concern for
the future that characterises policy- or consti-
tution-making. In the latter two areas, our pro-
posals must be guided by what is constant
rather than what is variable in human experi-
ence, and by our desire to protect future gene-
rations from generic harms: the harms of
environmental destruction and of political op-
pression. The idea of rights, premised as it is
upon a notion of generic interests that demand
protection, seems better fitted to convey this
than the idea of traditional continuity.
10 Intergenerational Justice Review
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currently existing rights even though their bea-
rers are deceased. Although we would also need
to give due weight to the rights (such as pro-
perty rights) of those who would be called
upon to bear the costs of restitution, it would
be a right of the deceased – not merely our
concern for them – that would be in the ba-
lance.
Rights and traditions
But there is an important objection to this
whole way of thinking. The objection is that it
is too ‘impersonal,’7 in the sense that it does
not appeal to the personal location or identity
of its intended audience: it does not claim, for
example, that a duty falls to anyone because
through their political membership they inhe-
rit a responsibility from the past, or that a right
belongs to them because of facts about their fa-
mily history or biological descent. Rather, the
approach treats other generations much as we
treat strangers, adopting an abstract idea of
equal respect. Indeed, as we have just seen, ad-
vocates claim that as the strength of their ap-
proach, for it avoids problematic ideas such as
descent or inheritance – ideas that are perhaps
more clearly at home in connection with the
transmission of physical things (genes, or pro-
perty) than in the context of abstract notions
such as responsibility or right. But we can rea-
dily see why this apparent strength accompa-
nies a weakness. If other generations (past or
future) have rights-based claims, then it does
not much matter who it is who satisfies them:
their claims are met, if they are, whoever meets
them. But from a certain point of view, it does
matter who it is that responds, for it is impor-
tant that the response should reflect and ack-
nowledge a connection. It is important that we
should make redress for what our ancestors
did, and that we should make provisions for
our descendants because they are ours. So are
‘impersonal’ standpoints, such as rights-based
ones, basically unsatisfactory? 
The first version of this view builds on the idea
of intergenerational community.8 As commu-
nitarians have argued, impersonal accounts of
obligation fall short, notoriously, in cases in
which persons are bound together by ties of af-
fection or reciprocity and so incur obligations
arising from their situation. Obligations of that
kind, while they may ultimately be consistent
with impersonal morality, cannot be derived
from it, they maintain, because they are em-
bedded in our specific circumstances. Now at
least the central cases of aﬀection and recipro-
city occur among those who co-exist, and the
communitarian case against impersonal mora-
lity has naturally centred on the community of
coevals, those who share social and political
space and contribute to shared life in mutually
beneficial ways. But may we not arrive at a si-
milar sense of reciprocity between generations?
An apt model is provided by intellectual tradi-
tions, such as scienti -
fic enquiry, for here
there is a strong
sense of participa-
tion in a transgene-
rational project.  Scientists – and other scho lars,
and many artists – clearly have a sense that they
are responding to the work of predecessors in
ways that they hope their successors will en-
dorse or at least appreciate; and implicit in this
enterprise is the idea that each generation’s
work has the potential to redefine what other
generations have done. It is not just a matter
that other generations will think of one’s work
diﬀerently – to revert to the theme of ‘reputa-
tion’ noted above – but that what you have done
will vary in consequence of subsequent work
by later generations, and the new light cast by
that on the work of generations previous to
yours. You want what you have done to stand
the test of transgenerational assessment. This
view, like others that we have mentioned, re-
jects an idea of welfare that is tied (only) to
subjective happiness, as opposed to objective
success.  One can derive subjective happiness
from a fine reputation: but a fine reputation is
worth something only if it expresses a fine
achievement, and so it is the fine achievement
that is actually the (rational) goal. It so hap-
pens that the measure of fine achievement is
transgenerational, thus transcending one’s bio-
logical life in a way that supports the idea of
community-in-time.
From ideal to reality
An immediate response to this proposal is that
it does not fit well with the kind of society that
we have. Modern societies, on this view, are
poorly constructed in terms of transgeneratio-
nal responsibility: their economic ethos calls
for extracting maximum returns from existing
resources, rather than for conserving them for
the future, and it calls for maximal mobility of
capital and labour, thus diminishing the sense
of shared place that encourages and reinforces
thoughts about what one has inherited and
what one can pass on. Scientific and other in-
tellectual traditions may only be (somewhat)
protected islands, their inhabitants rejecting
the market’s narrow temporal horizons out of
respect for our essential links with the past and
future. But there are at least two other contexts
in which the idea seems plausible. First, in re-
cent years ideas about transgenerational envi-
ronmental responsibility have taken a
remarkably firm hold, and in that particular
context the model may now seem far less uto-
pian than it once did. Second – a far older ex-
ample – the whole idea of constitutionalism
entails a deep concern for future generations. If
I look to the future because that's where I'm going to
spend the rest of my life.
/ George Burns /
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Rights and community
But there is a second important version of the
‘too-impersonal’ critique of the rights view.
This critical point of view relies on the conti-
nuity of political institutions over time, repre-
senting intergenerational justice in terms of
enduring commitments by states.10 It is not
just that other generations have rights: it is that
we are committed to respect them, by virtue of
our political membership. This is, at least in
one regard, a promising starting-point, for if
we are to suppose that responsibilities reach
from past to present and from present to fu-
ture, collective bodies such as states – and espe-
cially states – give us a solution to half of the
problem, that is, the location of a bearer. States
make claims, after all, based on their conti-
nuity through time, and it is easy to see how
burdens of responsibility follow. It may not be
so immediately clear that the other half of the
problem is solved: locating the objects of re-
sponsibility. States have, after all, a general duty
of care, and further steps must be taken before
particular beneficiaries are to be singled out for
special reparative concern; for most states have
failed to protect many of their citizens over
many centuries. But this half of the problem
may be solved, too, in the special case of pro-
mises or promise-like undertakings such as
treaties, for in that case the other party is also
picked out, by an historical event.
As we saw in the previous section, states, rather
more than traditions, aﬃrm their identity
through stable commitments such as constitu-
tions, the point of which is to bind their future
behaviour for reasons believed to be just. Trea-
ties provide another clear example, and a par-
ticularly relevant one, since breaches of treaty
obligations play a large part in the grievances of
aboriginal peoples. Even beyond those cases,
however, the model of treaty obligation may
oﬀer us a general way of understanding histo-
rical obligations. As a first step, treaty obligati-
ons are said to exemplify a ‘moral practice’11
that binds generations together. As a second
step, we may extend the implications of that
practice beyond the case of formal and specific
acts such as treaties. Let us consider the first
step first.
In many ways, states find it in their interest to
make commitments that, they propose, will
bind their future representatives. They under-
take projects whose time-to-completion ex-
ceeds one generational span, and pay for them
by selling bonds whose interest and redemp-
tion costs will fall to future generations. Their
doing so implies that future generations can be
bound by undertakings of the present genera-
tion, and that view can hardly be (honestly)
held unless accompanied by the view that we
in turn are bound by our predecessors’ under-
takings. And so we are led to a view of politi-
cal society as a chain of undertakings, each ge-
neration being obliged by decisions of its pre-
decessors, and by virtue of that rightfully
imposing obligations on its descendants.
But a society that believed it to be wrong to
impose on future generations would have no
obligation to include itself in this reasoning.
Strong democrats, for example, may think it
wrong to impose obligations on people with -
out their consent: Thomas Jeﬀerson, notably,
maintained that even constitutions would lose
their legitimacy after the passing of their ma-
kers, and therefore proposed that there should
be a constitutional convention whenever de-
mographic change resulted in a new voting
majority (every 19 years, given life expectancy
in his time).12 Likewise, some fiscal conservati-
ves object strongly to constraining future ge-
nerations’ economic freedom by transferring
public debt to them – a transfer reflecting an
ineﬃcient avoidance by one generation of the
true costs of its consumption decisions. To
those who hold such views, the ‘moral practice’
of intergenerational transfer is objectionable,
and so we would seem to need a further argu-
ment to make it generally compelling. Since it
is a practice that can be rejected, the bare fact
of its existence carries no moral weight.
Even for those who value it, though, there is, as
noted above, another step that needs taking be-
fore the model of treaty-observance can be ge-
neralised. One way of taking it is to extend the
idea of a formal undertaking, contained in oﬃ-
cial documents, to embrace informal and im-
plicit undertakings, which may also have
legitimately created expectations in other par-
ties. Another way, extending the core idea even
further, is to appeal to the idea of a state’s ge-
neral responsibility to all those subject to its
control: its failure to exercise responsible care is
often at least as damaging as its failure to ob-
serve treat obligations, and the former type of
failure is as morally serious as the latter. As
briefly noted above, such extensions, while su-
rely not mistaken, tend necessarily to make ob-
ligations less specific, given the enormous
range of possible claimants on the state.  The
main reason for doubt, however, arises from
questioning the core example itself.
Rights and existence
I believe, then, that the impersonal point of
view, as I have termed it – one that relies upon
the rights of persons whoever they are,  past,
present, or future – can survive both of these
important critiques. On the one hand, a poli-
tical society is only dubiously like a tradition;
and on the other, the model of historical com-
mitment seems too narrow to cover the moral
ground.
But there is a further reason for questioning
the rights-based approach, one that is, as it
were, internal to that approach. This line of cri-
ticism invites us to recall the point of using the
language of ‘rights’ in the first place, and on
that basis, while favouring the rights approach
in general, questions the very idea of ascribing
rights to those who do not exist.
Language is often a poor guide to sense, and
the fact that language allows us to ascribe rights
wherever an “interest” is to be found should
not, in itself, persuade us that it is valid, or not
misleading, to do so. So, for example, critics of
ascribing rights to non-human animals may
object on the grounds that the conditions that
underpin the language of rights are overlooked:
rights, they say, are statements about the terms
of association on which members of a com-
munity can agree, on the basis of dialogue and
experience – they get their point because per-
sons consent to them as fair ways of defining
their mutual expectations.13 All that makes
sense only among beings who can reason, con-
verse, consent, and comprehend the idea of
fairness, that is, humans. That sort of critique
is perfectly valid in principle, and if it fails it is
because it artificially constrains the context in
which rights can be used, for in fact the
language of rights is commonly used outside
the context of political association. We may
have no direct association with people who, we
believe, have human rights, for example, and
the language of rights is often employed to
broaden moral concern beyond the circle of as-
sociation and reciprocity, even though it is bey-
ond dispute that it was indeed that context that
formed the original matrix for the language of
rights.
Another possible line of critique, however, is
far less limiting. It is true, as discussed above,
that rights reflect important interests, and that
ordinary language allows us to separate inte-
rests from their bearers and to speak of them in
their bearers’ absence. But, it may be objected,
we are concerned about protecting interests in
the first place only because of the possibility of
a serious kind of loss to a bearer; and without
a bearer there can be no loss, so the basis of in-
itial concern evaporates. Imagine, as an exam-
ple, the absurdity of worrying about the
interests, hence the potential rights, of fictional
characters. That kind of consideration supports
the emphatic claim that nonexistent beings can
have no rights “because they do not exist.”14 As
Ernest Partridge suggests, when we think of de-
ceased persons as having rights we are playing
with a hidden shift of temporal perspective: as
living beings we can regret the loss that post-
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humous damage to our interests will cause, and
that anticipation may initially seem to justify
speaking of the rights of the deceased – but re-
flection shows us that since the loss can be ex-
perienced only in the anticipation of a living
person, it would have to be a living person’s
right that would be in play.15 So respect for the
wishes of the dead, with regard to the protec-
tion of their interests, is best understood as part
of a chain of expectations, whereby each gene-
ration, expecting its own wishes to be honou-
red posthumously, honours the wishes of the
dead --it is best understood in terms of a con-
tinuing ‘moral practice’ of the kind discussed
above in connection with historical reparati-
ons.  It seems to me, however, that the case for
valuing such a practice is much better at the
personal than at the societal level, where, as
noted above, whatever weight we gave it would
need to be balanced by a very wide range of
other public responsibilities.
Partridge, although a sharp critic of ascribing
rights to the dead, acknowledges that this line
of objection does not bear on the question of
the rights of future generations, for the simple
reason that the interests in question will even-
tually connect up with bearers, on condition
only that they come into existence. We can, in
that case, perfectly well speak of avoiding loss,
and the language of rights is therefore mea-
ningful even to those who make the objection
in question. (The objection would, however,
continue to apply in full to any alleged right
to exist, for if no beings existed there would of
course be none to register the loss of existence.)
From future to past?
A rights-based argument, then, is preferable to
arguments from community or continuity, but
is more successful in the case of future genera-
tions. Does that mean that the idea of histori-
cal injustice is negligible? That is a conclusion
that most would find unfortunate, even if they
found it defensible; but it would not in fact fol-
low from the arguments above, for there are
reasons other than those discussed to take past
injustice seriously. Some of these are the same
as the reasons for caring about any injustice
whatsoever. We could call these interests-of-
justice reasons: they are reasons for wanting in-
justice to be condemned regardless of time or
place. Others relate to the interests of the li-
ving. These come into play whenever, as we
began by discussing, past injustice leaves pre-
sent marks, as is usually the case. But what dee-
pens the connection between past injustice and
its present marks is that the full comprehen-
sion of the past injustice is always important
to understanding what remedy is due.  
Some fear that, if we understand past injustice
only in terms of present deprivation, we reduce
the recounting of the past to mere propaganda
12
– to a sentimental appeal designed to give emo-
tional support to current interests.16 But surely
that is not so. The marks left by past atrocities
are both complex and specific to the case: what
was lost and how it was lost are considerations
without which one cannot even begin to con-
sider how remedy or compensation are possi-
ble, for the present consequences of genocide,
expropriation, and cultural destruction (for ex-
ample) diﬀer in significant ways. There are
also, as noted, impersonal ‘interests of justice’
at stake. But to the extent that there are perso-
nal interests at stake, they are those of the li-
ving, and, no less, of course, of the future
generations to whom the marks of injustice
may be transmitted in turn. If what happened
in the past carries wounds forward into the fu-
ture, then even if we cannot say that past vic-
tims have rights, surely we can say that future
generations have rights that will be better pro-
tected if the injustices of the past are confron-
ted in the present. What could be more
important than ending the undeserved trans-
mission of evil? The idea of intergenerational
rights is more persuasive in relation to future
generations than in relation to past ones, I have
argued: but that certainly does not mean that
what happened in the past is irrelevant to what
we owe to the future, for coming to terms with
its consequences may be part of what we owe
to our descendants. In that sense, perhaps we
may say that past generations resemble the be-
neficiaries of the rights of future ones, rather
than bearing rights themselves.
Notes
(1) See Waldron 1992: 4-28; Vernon 2003: 542-557.
(2) Raz 1984. This remains the standard statement of the
“interest” theory of  rights: see Ivison, 2008, 34. For the rival
“choice” theory of rights, see Ivison, 33-35. It is not discus-
sed in this article, since it precludes the rights of nonexistent
people by definition. 
(3) See especially Feinberg 1980: 159-184; and the critique
by Partridge 1981:  243-264.
(4) Partridge 1981: 251.
(5) Ridge 2003: 38-39.
(6) Ridge 2003: 44.
(7) The term is O’Neill’s 2001.
(8) For a powerful statement of this view, see O’Neill 2001.
(9) On this topic see Holmes 1995.
(10) A lucid version of this view is oﬀered in Thompson
2002.
(11) Ibid: 16.
(12) Holmes 1995: 141-142.
(13) Scruton 2000.
(14) DeGeorge 1991.
(15) Partridge 1981: 255-259.
(16) Simmons 1995: 149-184.
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